Seth Lazar, Philosopher and Photographer

Although the principle of noncombatant immunity has achieved widespread support across cultures and epochs, it has proved embarrassingly difficult for contemporary philosophers to justify. Both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist arguments in its favour have come up short. In recent and forthcoming work, a number of scholars occupying otherwise diverse positions in the debate have settled on the view that noncombatant immunity can be grounded in the principle of necessity. Because killing noncombatants is so rarely military necessary, it is almost always impermissible. This view has been advocated by Jeff McMahan and Henry Shue, as well as Yitzhak Benbaji, Helen Frowe, and Judith Lichtenberg. I think it is a mistake to think that necessity can play a significant role in justifying noncombatant immunity. In this paper I look in particular at the strategic nature of asymmetric conflicts, arguing that there are numerous instances when it is at least reasonable to believe that attacking noncombatants is militarily necessary. I then present an alternative argument for noncombatant immunity, grounded in the distinctive vulnerability and defencelessness of noncombatants. My thought is that the more defenceless one’s target is, the more presumptively wrongful the attack, other things equal. I ground this thought in arguments that focus on both the attacker and the victim. Cowardice and cruelty mar attacks on the defenceless; they are a betrayal of the duty of care that the strong owe the weak. As a victim, to be attacked when defenceless is qualitatively worse than when you can defend yourself—both because you will suffer more, and because you are utterly disempowered by these attacks. At least when you can defend yourself, you have some control over your destiny. Undoubtedly noncombatant immunity has many sources, of which this is just one. And undoubtedly necessity can play a role therein, sometimes. But if we don’t want noncombatant immunity to be vulnerable to the contingent calculations of necessity, we must seek more intrinsic arguments against attacking civilians. I presented this paper in Belgrade, July 2010. It will form part of my book, though I may also seek to publish it independently when I’ve had a chance to work on it some more.