Seth Lazar, Philosopher and Photographer

Associative duties are non-contractual duties owed in virtue of a valuable relationship. General duties are owed to people simply in virtue of their humanity. In this paper, I ask what should be done when we can perform either an associative duty or a general duty, but not both. There are two types of solutions to this question, which will be called compatibilist and incompatibilist. Compatibilist responses deny any real tension between associative and general duties, in two ways. The first, compossibilist, variant rejects the terms of the question, arguing that tradeoffs cannot occur, because each set of duties can be fully discharged without compromising the other. The second, generalist, variant of compatibilism concedes that sometimes tradeoffs may be necessary. However, it contends that these tradeoffs are always easily resolvable, because there is a clear priority ordering between the two sets of duties: general duties always trump their associative counterparts. Incompatibilist responses hold that associative and general duties are genuinely in tension with one another: that is, (1) contra the compossibilist, there will indeed be tradeoffs between associative and general duties, and (2) contra the generalist, sometimes the associative duty will win out. My aim, in this paper, is first to pinpoint the terrain on which the debate between these three positions should be held, and then to show that, once on that terrain, incompatibilism looks more plausible than the alternatives.

This paper was published, January 2009, in Journal of Political Philosophy. You can view it here: Do Associative Duties Really Not Matter?.

Combatants in war lay waste the environment, destroy cultural heritage, wound, maim and kill. Most importantly, they kill. Such acts would in any other context be abhorrent. If warfare is to be permissible, these deeds must first be justified. A potential combatant might reason like this: People have general duties to one another, owed in virtue of their shared humanity. Among these, some are duties of justice, linked to rights held by the duty’s beneficiary. The general duty not to kill is a duty of justice, correlative with the right to life. Breaching the duty, so violating the right, is normally the gravest injustice one can commit. If warfare is to be justified, therefore, either the relevant duties of justice must not apply, or they must be overridden by stronger countervailing reasons. In the first instance warfare is just; in the second it is justified, though unjust.

Most philosophers believe warfare must be just to be justified. This includes Michael Walzer, whose Just and Unjust Wars was the fulcrum of debate in the late twentieth century, and the numerous analytical philosophers who have exposed flaws in Walzer’s arguments—most notable among them, Jeff McMahan. In War and Associative Duties, I argue that this consensus view is mistaken. Wars cannot be fought without breaching grave duties of justice. Part I defends this assertion; part II explores one way in which fighting may nevertheless be justified. Continue reading »