Australian National University
3500 word entry on the state of contemporary just war theory, used in two recent Oxford Companions. Due out this year I think.
My working paper on the aftermath of war has led to a publication in a volume edited by Larry May with Andrew Forcehimes, to be published in June 2012, by Cambridge University Press. The book is called Morality, Jus Post Bellum and International Law, you can read about it here.
Here’s the introduction:
6000 word entry focusing on the discussion of war in contemporary analytical philosophy. Distinguishes that approach from historical just war theory because of the former’s overriding emphasis on the importance of individual human rights to the ethics of war. Characterises Walzer’s principal contributions to jus ad bellum and jus in bello as his orientation of those questions around human rights: we may fight to protect fundamental rights, but in doing so we must not violate others’ rights. Identifies the principal criticisms of Walzer’s elaboration of these themes, but notes that few critics question whether it is really possible to render the ethics of war consistent with individual rights in this way. Indicates the possible direction of travel for those who think that a rights-respecting war is an unattainable ideal. Invited submission for the Wiley Blackwell International Encyclopaedia of Ethics. Publication has been delayed, but there is some promise of the 9 volume megalith hitting the shelves in 2012 (see here for more).
Paper for the new Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, edited by Andrei Marmor. Publication scheduled for March 2012.
Extract from the conclusion:
This paper asks whether we can defend associative duties to our compatriots that are grounded solely in the relationship of liberal co-citizenship.The sort of duties that are specially salient to this relationship are duties of justice, duties to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship, and a duty to favour the interests of compatriots over those of foreigners. Critics have argued that the liberal conception of citizenship is too insubstantial to sustain these duties — indeed, that it gives us little reason to treat compatriots any differently from how we treat foreigners, with all the practical consequences that this would entail. I suggest that on a specific conception of liberal citizenship we can, in fact, defend associative duties, but that these extend only to the duty to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship. Duties of justice and favouritism, I maintain, cannot be particularised to one’s compatriots.
You can see the paper here: A Liberal Defence of (Some) Duties to Compatriots.
Jeff McMahan’s theory of permissible killing in war, developed over the last 15 years and most recently developed in his Killing in War (OUP, 2009), faces two objections. The contingent pacifist objection asserts that his restrictive conception of the basis for individual liability to lethal attack—moral responsibility for an objectively unjustified threat—renders it impossible to fight even the most justified wars justly, since we cannot distinguish between those who are, and are not liable. The total war objection argues that, by making responsibility the basis of liability, rather than the fact one poses a threat, his account threatens to make too many noncombatants permissible targets of lethal force. Killing in War seeks to address both of these objections, but I argue that McMahan’s response to each contradicts the other. The contingent pacifist objection is rebutted by expanding the scope of liability, so no combatants on the unjust side will escape. But expanding liability only gives the total war objection greater purchase. This paper defends this core objection, which I call the ‘responsibility dilemma’ both for McMahan, and for any philosopher who wants to ground liability to be killed in war in responsibility for unjustified threats.
You can read the paper here: The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War.