Seth Lazar, Philosopher and Photographer

This paper grew out of a working paper I  wrote in summer 2010. It attempts an analysis of the concept of necessity as it applies in self-defence and war–too often philosophers assume that necessity is either unimportant or immediately perspicuous; but it is neither. Read on for the introduction. This paper has just been accepted by Philosophy & Public Affairs, for their Winter 2012 edition, and is part of a broader project on Necessity and Noncombatant Immunity. Continue reading »

Paper for the new Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, edited by Andrei Marmor. Publication scheduled for March 2012.

Extract from the conclusion:

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3500 word entry on the state of contemporary just war theory, used in two recent Oxford Companions. Due out this year I think.

My working paper on the aftermath of war has led to a publication in a volume edited by Larry May with Andrew Forcehimes, to be published in June 2012, by Cambridge University Press. The book is called Morality, Jus Post Bellum and International Law, you can read about it here.

Here’s the introduction:

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6000 word entry focusing on the discussion of war in contemporary analytical philosophy. Distinguishes that approach from historical just war theory because of the former’s overriding emphasis on the importance of individual human rights to the ethics of war. Characterises Walzer’s principal contributions to jus ad bellum and jus in bello as his orientation of those questions around human rights: we may fight to protect fundamental rights, but in doing so we must not violate others’ rights. Identifies the principal criticisms of Walzer’s elaboration of these themes, but notes that few critics question whether it is really possible to render the ethics of war consistent with individual rights in this way. Indicates the possible direction of travel for those who think that a rights-respecting war is an unattainable ideal. Invited submission for the Wiley Blackwell International Encyclopaedia of Ethics. Publication has been delayed, but there is some promise of the 9 volume megalith hitting the shelves in 2012 (see here for more).

Review of Larry May’s edited volume. http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/120/479/895.short?rss=1

Introduction to Symposium, which I edited, on Jeff McMahan’s Killing in War. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/662618

This paper asks whether we can defend associative duties to our compatriots that are grounded solely in the relationship of liberal co-citizenship.The sort of duties that are specially salient to this relationship are duties of justice, duties to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship, and a duty to favour the interests of compatriots over those of foreigners. Critics have argued that the liberal conception of citizenship is too insubstantial to sustain these duties — indeed, that it gives us little reason to treat compatriots any differently from how we treat foreigners, with all the practical consequences that this would entail. I suggest that on a specific conception of liberal citizenship we can, in fact, defend associative duties, but that these extend only to the duty to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship. Duties of justice and favouritism, I maintain, cannot be particularised to one’s compatriots.

You can see the paper here: A Liberal Defence of (Some) Duties to Compatriots.

Jeff McMahan’s theory of permissible killing in war, developed over the last 15 years and most recently developed in his Killing in War (OUP, 2009), faces two objections. The contingent pacifist objection asserts that his restrictive conception of the basis for individual liability to lethal attack—moral responsibility for an objectively unjustified threat—renders it impossible to fight even the most justified wars justly, since we cannot distinguish between those who are, and are not liable. The total war objection argues that, by making responsibility the basis of liability, rather than the fact one poses a threat, his account threatens to make too many noncombatants permissible targets of lethal force. Killing in War seeks to address both of these objections, but I argue that McMahan’s response to each contradicts the other. The contingent pacifist objection is rebutted by expanding the scope of liability, so no combatants on the unjust side will escape. But expanding liability only gives the total war objection greater purchase. This paper defends this core objection, which I call the ‘responsibility dilemma’ both for McMahan, and for any philosopher who wants to ground liability to be killed in war in responsibility for unjustified threats.

You can read the paper here: The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War.

Combatants in war kill and maim perfect strangers, committing acts that would be, in almost any other context, paradigmatically unjust. Conventional just war theory holds that they can avoid injustice, provided they only kill those who threaten their lives. This permissive standard has been much criticised. In particular, some argue that combatants can only justly kill enemies who are responsible for an unjustified threat to their lives. Initially, it was thought that responsibility should rise to the level of culpability; this standard has proved too restrictive, however, as even unjustified combatants are often blameless for the threat they pose. Responding to this concern, Jeff McMahan, David Rodin, and others have proposed that mere agent responsibility is sufficient to establish liability—if combatants meet the minimum standards of responsible agency, and they acted voluntarily in creating the unjustified threat, then they can be liable to be killed, even if they are wholly blameless. McMahan in particular has developed a detailed defence of this position, arguing that where A’s voluntary conduct—however blameless—imposes risks on B, A should lose his right not to bear the costs when those risks eventuate in B being forced to choose between their lives. In this paper, I set out and criticise McMahan’s position, arguing in particular that agent responsibility for the imposition of risks does not adequately differentiate between A and B, since B will also be agent-responsible for imposing risks on A. In the absence of any asymmetry between A and B, there are no grounds for either becoming liable to be killed in self-defence. This relaxation of the standard of liability is, in my view, a retrograde step: potential combatants should not imagine that they can main and kill without injustice.

This paper was published in the July 2009 edition of Ethics, and can be viewed here: Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defense.

Combatants in war lay waste the environment, destroy cultural heritage, wound, maim and kill. Most importantly, they kill. Such acts would in any other context be abhorrent. If warfare is to be permissible, these deeds must first be justified. A potential combatant might reason like this: People have general duties to one another, owed in virtue of their shared humanity. Among these, some are duties of justice, linked to rights held by the duty’s beneficiary. The general duty not to kill is a duty of justice, correlative with the right to life. Breaching the duty, so violating the right, is normally the gravest injustice one can commit. If warfare is to be justified, therefore, either the relevant duties of justice must not apply, or they must be overridden by stronger countervailing reasons. In the first instance warfare is just; in the second it is justified, though unjust.

Most philosophers believe warfare must be just to be justified. This includes Michael Walzer, whose Just and Unjust Wars was the fulcrum of debate in the late twentieth century, and the numerous analytical philosophers who have exposed flaws in Walzer’s arguments—most notable among them, Jeff McMahan. In War and Associative Duties, I argue that this consensus view is mistaken. Wars cannot be fought without breaching grave duties of justice. Part I defends this assertion; part II explores one way in which fighting may nevertheless be justified. Continue reading »