Seth Lazar, Philosopher and Photographer

Short paper focusing on how to characterise bystanders, obstructors and threats in the ethics of self-defense; primarily a response to ideas on this topic from Helen Frowe.

Theorists of both war and self-defence share a concern to justify harming those who pose a threat, while retaining a firm prohibition on harming those who do not. Just war theorists would thereby reinforce the principle of noncombatant immunity, a cross-cultural linchpin of permissible conduct in wars which is embarrassingly difficult for philosophers to sustain; theorists of self-defence would be able to explain the permissibility of killing innocent threats, without condoning obviously objectionable acts of murderous self-preservation. Unfortunately for both sets of theorists, however, if they adopt a certain view of permissible killing, it is difficult to explain just why it is permissible to kill threats, without by the same token bringing bystanders and noncombatants within the scope of permissible harm. The view in question states that, unless in order to avert a catastrophe, another person can be killed without his consent only if he has something to render himself liable to that killing—that is, to make it so that killing him does not also wrong him. Since becoming liable to be killed is a serious matter indeed, one should only become liable for very good reasons. Many think that responsibility for an unjustified threat is the only reason weighty enough—if you are responsible for an unjustified threat to my life, then I may kill you in self-defence without wronging you. But if it’s responsibility for a threat that matters, then on the one hand, individuals who are responsible for a threat without posing it will be liable to be killed; while on the other hand, individuals whose pose a threat for which they are not responsible (innocent threats), will not be liable. Continue reading »