Australian National University
Argument for the principle of noncombatant immunity that draws on multiple overlapping arguments, including a high threshold for liability, the distinctive vulnerability of noncombatants, the institutional dimensions of the combatant/noncombatant distinction, and rule-consequentialist and contractarian arguments. Still writing this one, but it grew out of this working paper from 2010.
Like this paper on necessity in self-defence and war, this essay on the necessity-based argument for noncombatant immunity grew out of an earlier project. It’s currently under review. Introduction follows.
My contribution for Cecile Fabre and my co-edited volume on Justifying National Defence, which we’re hoping to publish in 2012. Read on for the introduction:
Although the principle of noncombatant immunity has achieved widespread support across cultures and epochs, it has proved embarrassingly difficult for contemporary philosophers to justify. Both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist arguments in its favour have come up short. In recent and forthcoming work, a number of scholars occupying otherwise diverse positions in the debate have settled on the view that noncombatant immunity can be grounded in the principle of necessity. Because killing noncombatants is so rarely military necessary, it is almost always impermissible. This view has been advocated by Jeff McMahan and Henry Shue, as well as Yitzhak Benbaji, Helen Frowe, and Judith Lichtenberg. I think it is a mistake to think that necessity can play a significant role in justifying noncombatant immunity. In this paper I look in particular at the strategic nature of asymmetric conflicts, arguing that there are numerous instances when it is at least reasonable to believe that attacking noncombatants is militarily necessary. I then present an alternative argument for noncombatant immunity, grounded in the distinctive vulnerability and defencelessness of noncombatants. Continue reading »