

# Introduction to Ethics

## Outline

We all already do ethics; in that sense no introduction is needed. We deliberate over the right thing to do, and evaluate our own choices and those made by others. This course provides the philosophical toolkit to enhance and to challenge convictions you already have.

Ethics is conventionally split three ways: into metaethics, normative ethics, and applied or practical ethics. Metaethics is the inquiry into the status of moral claims. We ask how such claims should be understood, beginning with the simple, but fundamental question: why should we be moral? Is it in our interests to act morally? If not, should we do the right thing anyway? What, after all, do these moral claims mean—what do they amount to? Do they describe the world as it really is, or merely express cultural conventions, or individual approval and disapproval? In the first five lectures, we explore the foundations of ethics.

Suppose we agree that we should be moral—and that we can make sense of moral claims. How then should we act? Are there general principles we should follow—a theory that we can apply—or must we rely in each instance on unassisted judgment? Normative ethics is the terrain of moral theory and anti-theory: the bold constructions of some of the most ambitious ethicists in the western tradition, and the objections raised by the perennial sceptics. We address two philosophers who each thought morality could be reduced, at its heart, to a single principle: John Stuart Mill, who avowed the maximisation of aggregate happiness, and Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative never to treat humanity, whether in oneself or in others, as a means only, but always also as an end in itself. In lecture 6 we discuss Mill's *Utilitarianism*, and in lecture 7 we examine a range of objections to utilitarianism, and consequentialist theories more generally. In lecture 8 we discuss more sophisticated consequentialist responses to these objections. We turn to Kant in lecture 9, focusing on his categorical imperative, and the thesis of universalisability, according to which we should always act on grounds that could be taken by all as a universal law. In lecture 10 we discuss the difference between duties of right and of virtue, in Kant's work. Lectures 11-15 cover contemporary echoes of Kant, addressing first the ideas of moral status, individual inviolability, and how it can sometimes be impermissible to realise the best outcomes. We then examine attempts to underpin the doctrines of double effect, and doing and allowing, which affirm the commonsense nonconsequentialist beliefs that there is a difference between intending and merely foreseeing harm to others, and between causing a harm oneself, and allowing it to happen. We then examine more systematic attempts to deploy quasi-Kantian insights in contemporary moral theory, in particular the idea that the rules for conduct most consistent with each preserving the maximal liberty consistent with others' equal freedom are those we would agree upon in a fair bargain. The contractualist theories of John Rawls and T. M. Scanlon are our focus in lectures 13, 14 and 15. In our remaining two sessions on normative ethics, we address the attempt by contemporary Aristotelians to provide an alternative to moral theory, grounded in the virtues, beginning with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, before turning to modern iterations and objections.

In the last three sessions, we turn the insights acquired over the course of the quarter to some intractable problems in the ethics of killing. We discuss abortion, euthanasia, and warfare in turn, at each point counterposing the major theoretical perspectives with the commonsense judgments raised by plausible examples. We do not aim, obviously, to resolve these problems, but with the skills you have developed during the quarter, you should be better able to articulate and to question your most deep-seated beliefs.

## Requirements

### *Reading*

The following bibliography identifies core reading, which should be completed for each lecture, and additional reading, which is optional. Many of the texts are challenging, but all should be within the scope of capable undergraduates, provided you budget sufficient time. Careful notes are a good idea. Students may be informally quizzed to determine whether they have covered the required ground. If necessary, more formal tests will be used.

### *Written Assignments*

You will write three essays of 2,000 to 2,500 words, one each on metaethics, normative ethics, and practical ethics. Essay topics will be set. Papers will be marked according to three criteria: mastery of the debate, technical aptitude, and originality. Mastery of the debate does not mean regurgitating what you have read: you must be able to weave arguments together. Technical aptitude refers to conceptual and logical clarity. You are most likely to be original if you begin by asking why the topic matters to you, and if you have confidence in those convictions, as well as the courage to subject them to rigorous examination. For a guide to writing philosophy essays, see <http://www.sethlazar.org.uk/documents/essaywriting.pdf>.

### *Lecture Attendance and Participation*

Lectures will occupy most of each class, but time will be set aside for questions and discussion. Participation and attendance will contribute or otherwise to your overall assessment, as per normal faculty practice.

## Schedule

### *Introduction*

#### 1. Introduction to Introduction to Ethics

*The first class will involve an overview of the course ahead, and an opportunity for students to discuss and record their pretheoretical judgments about some of the key questions that will later be raised.*

### *Metaethics*

#### 2. Why Be Moral?

##### Core:

1. James Rachels, and Stuart Rachels (ed.). *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2010. Chapter 5: 'Ethical Egoism'.
2. Bernard Williams. *Problems of the Self; Philosophical Papers 1956-1972*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Chapter 15: 'Egoism and Altruism'.
3. Philippa Foot. *Virtues and Vices, and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Chapter 11: 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives'.

##### Additional:

4. Plato, G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.), and Tom Griffith (trans.). *The Republic*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Book 2 to 367e.

5. David Hume, and Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.). *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Sections 5 and 9, appendix I.
6. Brad Hooker. "Does Moral Virtue Constitute a Benefit to the Agent?" In *How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues*, edited by Roger Crisp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 141-56.
7. Elliot Sober. "Psychological Egoism." In *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*, edited by Hugh LaFollette. Malden: Blackwell, 2001, pp. 129-48.

### 3. Subjective and Objective Theories of Well-Being

#### Core:

1. James Griffin. *Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Chapters 1-3.

#### Additional:

2. Derek Parfit. *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Appendix I.
3. Shelly Kagan. "The Limits of Well-Being." *Social Philosophy and Policy* 9:2 (1992), pp. 169-89.
4. T. M. Scanlon. *What We Owe to Each Other*. London: Belknap Press, 1998. Chapter 3: 'Well-Being'
5. Amartya Sen. "Utilitarianism and Welfarism." *The Journal of Philosophy* 76:9 (1979), pp. 463-89.

### 4. Relativism

#### Core:

1. James Rachels, and Stuart Rachels (ed.). *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2010. Chapter 2: 'The Challenge of Cultural Relativism'.
2. Gilbert Harman. "Moral Relativism Defended." *The Philosophical Review* 84:1 (1975), pp. 3-22.
3. Simon Blackburn. "Relativism." In *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*, edited by Hugh LaFollette. Malden: Blackwell, 2001, pp. 38-52.

#### Additional:

4. Simon Caney. *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Chapter 2: 'Universalism'.
5. Ija Lazari-Pawłowska. "On Cultural Relativism." *The Journal of Philosophy* 67:17 (1970), pp. 577-84.
6. James Dreier. "Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, edited by David Copp. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 240-64.

### 5. The Meaning of Moral Claims

#### Core:

1. A. J. Ayer. *Language, Truth, and Logic*. New York: Dover Publications, 1952. Preface and Chapter 6: 'Critique of Ethics and Theology'.
2. Simon Blackburn. "Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, edited by David Copp. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 146-62.
3. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. "Moral Realism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, edited by David Copp. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 39-62.

#### Additional:

4. Charles L. Stevenson. *Facts and Values; Studies in Ethical Analysis*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. Chapters 1 and 2.

5. David Wiggins. "Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life." In *Essays on Moral Realism*, edited by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 127-65.
6. Ronald Dworkin. "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 25:2 (1996), pp. 87-139.

## *Normative Ethics*

### 6. Consequentialism 1: Utilitarianism

Core:

1. John Stuart Mill, and Roger Crisp (ed.). *Utilitarianism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
2. James Rachels, and Stuart Rachels (ed.). *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2010. Chapter 7: 'The Utilitarian Approach'.

Additional:

3. J. J. C. Smart, and Bernard Williams. *Utilitarianism; for and Against*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Chapter 1: 'An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics'.
4. Henry R. West. *An Introduction to Mill's Utilitarian Ethics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
5. John Skorupski. "The Place of Utilitarianism in Mill's Philosophy." In *The Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism*, edited by Henry R. West. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 45-60.

### 7. Consequentialism 2: Objections

Core:

1. J. J. C. Smart, and Bernard Williams. *Utilitarianism; for and Against*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Chapter 2: 'A Critique of Utilitarianism'.
2. Neera Badhwar Kapur. "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship." *Ethics* 101:3 (1991), pp. 483-504.
3. Michael Stocker. "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship." *The Journal of Philosophy* 78:12 (1981), pp. 747-65.

Additional:

4. Samuel Scheffler. *The Rejection of Consequentialism*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Chapter 3.
5. T. M. Scanlon. *What We Owe to Each Other*. London: Belknap Press, 1998. Chapter 2: Values.
6. Lawrence A. Blum. *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*. London: Routledge, 1980.

### 8. Consequentialism 3: Responses

Core:

1. Peter Railton. "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 13:2 (1984), pp. 134-71.
2. David O. Brink. "Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View." *The Journal of Philosophy* 83:8 (1986), pp. 417-38.
3. John Broome. *Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. Chapters 1 and 2.

Additional:

4. Brad Hooker. "Rule-Consequentialism." In *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*, edited by Hugh LaFollette. Malden: Blackwell, 2001, pp. 183-204.
5. Robert F. Card. "Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 85:2 (2004), pp. 149-72.
6. Douglas W. Portmore. "Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 86:1 (2005), pp. 95-113.
7. Mark Schroeder. "Not So Promising after All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 87:3 (2006), pp. 348-56.

9. Kant 1: Universalisability and the Categorical Imperative

Core:

1. Immanuel Kant, Mary J. Gregor (trans.), and Christine M. Korsgaard (ed.). *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
2. Immanuel Kant, Mary J. Gregor (trans.), and Roger J. Sullivan (ed.). *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Additional:

3. Christine M. Korsgaard. *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Chapters 1 and 3.
4. Onora O'Neill. "Kantian Ethics." In *A Companion to Ethics*, edited by Peter Singer. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 175-85.
5. Marcia Baron. "Kantian Ethics." In *Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate*, edited by Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit and Michael A. Slote. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 3-91.

10. Kant 2: Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue

Core:

1. Immanuel Kant, Mary J. Gregor (trans.), and Christine M. Korsgaard (ed.). *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
2. Immanuel Kant, Mary J. Gregor (trans.), and Roger J. Sullivan (ed.). *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Additional:

3. J. B. Schneewind. "Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Philosophy." In *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, edited by Paul Guyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 309-41.
4. Marcia Baron, and Melissa Seymour Fahmy. "Beneficence and Other Duties of Love in *the Metaphysics of Morals*." In *The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics*, edited by Thomas E. Hill. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 211-28.
5. Allen W. Wood. "Duties to Oneself, Duties of Respect to Others." In *The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics*, edited by Thomas E. Hill. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 229-52.

11. Modern Nonconsequentialism 1: Agent-Relativity and Inviolability

Core:

1. Thomas Nagel. *The View from Nowhere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Chapter 9.
2. Samuel Scheffler. *The Rejection of Consequentialism*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Chapter 4.

3. John Rawls. *A Theory of Justice*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Sections 5, 6, 30.
4. Frances M. Kamm. "Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 21:4 (1992), pp. 354–89.

Additional:

5. Thomas Nagel. "Personal Rights and Public Space." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 24:2 (1995), pp. 83–107.
6. Jonathan Bennett. "Morality and Consequences." In *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Volume Two*, edited by Sterling McMurrin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 47–116.
7. Iwao Hirose. "Aggregation and Numbers." *Utilitas* 16:01 (2004), pp. 62–79.
8. S. Matthew Liao. "Who Is Afraid of Numbers?" *Utilitas* 20:04 (2008), pp. 447–61.

## 12. Modern Nonconsequentialism 2: Double Effect, Doing and Allowing

Core:

1. Warren S. Quinn. "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 18:4 (1989), pp. 334–51.
2. Warren S. Quinn. "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing." *Philosophical Review* 89 (1989), pp. 287–312.
3. Alison McIntyre. "Doing Away with Double Effect." *Ethics* 111:2 (2001), pp. 219–55.

Additional:

4. Samuel Scheffler. "Doing and Allowing." *Ethics* 114:2 (2004), pp. 215–39.
5. Neil Francis Delaney. "Two Cheers for "Closeness": Terror, Targeting and Double Effect." *Philosophical Studies* 137:3 (2006), pp. 335–67.
6. Jeff McMahan. "Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid." *Ethics* 103:2 (1993), pp. 250–79.

## 13. Contractualism 1: Reading Rawls

Core:

1. John Rawls. *A Theory of Justice*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Chapters 1–3, 5.

Additional:

2. John Rawls, and Erin Kelly (ed.). *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*. London: Harvard University Press, 2001. Sections 17–40.
3. John Rawls. *Political Liberalism*. Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1996. Lectures 3, 4 and 6.

## 14. Contractualism 2: Criticism of the Original Position

Core:

1. T. M. Scanlon. "Rawls on Justification." In *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, edited by S. Freeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 139–67.
2. Ronald Dworkin. "The Original Position." In *Reading Rawls*, edited by Norman Daniels. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975, pp. 16–52.
3. Brian Barry. *A Treatise on Social Justice, Vol. II: Justice as Impartiality*. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1995. Chapter 3.

Additional:

4. G. A. Cohen. *Rescuing Justice and Equality*. London: Harvard University Press, 2008. Chapter 7.
5. Seyla Benhabib. "The Generalised and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory." In *Feminism as Critique: Essays on the Politics of Gender in Late-Capitalist Societies*, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell. Cambridge: Polity, 1987, pp. 77-95.
6. Brian Barry. *A Treatise on Social Justice, Vol. II: Justice as Impartiality*. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1995. Chapters 1-2.

15. Contractualism 3: Scanlon

Core:

1. T. M. Scanlon. *What We Owe to Each Other*. London: Belknap Press, 1998. Chapters 1, 4 and 5.
2. Brad Hooker. "Contractualism, Spare Wheel, Aggregation." In *Scanlon and Contractualism*, edited by Matt Matravers. London: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 53-76.

Additional:

3. T. M. Scanlon. "Contractualism and Utilitarianism." In *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Arthur Owen Williams. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 103-28.
4. Frank Lovett. "Can Justice Be Based on Consent?" *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12:1 (2004), pp. 79-101.
5. Derek Parfit. "Justifiability to Each Person." *Ratio* 16:4 (2003), pp. 368-90.

16. Virtue Ethics 1: Aristotle

Core:

1. Aristotle, and Roger Crisp (ed.). *Nicomachean Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Book 1, book 2 chapters 1-7, book 6 chapters 9-11, book 7 chapters 1-10.

Additional:

2. G. X. Santos. "Does Aristotle Have a Virtue Ethics?" In *Virtue Ethics*, edited by Daniel Statman. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997, pp. 260-85.
3. Thomas Nagel. "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*." In *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, edited by Amélie Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 7-14.
4. J. O. Urmson. "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean." In *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, edited by Amélie Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 157-70.
5. Kathleen V. Wilkes. "The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle's Ethics." In *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, edited by Amélie Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 341-58.
6. Bernard Williams. "Justice as a Virtue." In *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, edited by Amélie Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 189-200.

17. Virtue Ethics 2: Contemporary Discussion

Core:

1. G. E. M. Anscombe. "Modern Moral Philosophy." In *Virtue Ethics*, edited by Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 26-44.
2. Michael A. Slote. "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics." In *Virtue Ethics*, edited by Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 239-62.

3. Michael Stocker. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." In *Virtue Ethics*, edited by Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 66-78.

Additional:

4. James Rachels, and Stuart Rachels (ed.). *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2010. Chapter 12: 'The Ethics of Virtue'.

5. Julia Annas. "Virtue Ethics." In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, edited by David Copp, 515-36. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

6. R. B. Loudon. "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics." In *Virtue Ethics*, edited by Daniel Statman. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997, pp. 180-93.

7. P. Montague. "Virtue Ethics: A Qualified Success Story." In *Virtue Ethics*, edited by Daniel Statman. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997, pp. 194-204.

8. D. Solomon. "Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics." In *Virtue Ethics*, edited by Daniel Statman. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997, pp. 165-79.

## *Practical Ethics*

### 18. Abortion

Core:

1. John Finnis. "Abortion and Health-Care Ethics." In *Bioethics: An Anthology*, edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 17-24.

2. Judith Jarvis Thomson. "A Defense of Abortion." In *Bioethics: An Anthology*, edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 40-50.

3. Jeff McMahan. *The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 398-422.

Additional:

4. Michael Tooley. "Abortion and Infanticide." In *Bioethics: An Anthology*, edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 25-39.

5. Toby Ord. "The Scourge: Moral Implications of Natural Embryo Loss." *The American Journal of Bioethics* 8:7 (2008), pp. 12-19.

6. Don Marquis. "Why Abortion Is Immoral." In *Bioethics: An Anthology*, edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 51-62.

### 19. Euthanasia

Core:

1. Jeff McMahan. *The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 455-492.

2. James Rachels. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." In *Bioethics: An Anthology*, edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 288-91.

3. Jonathan Glover. "The Sanctity of Life." In *Bioethics: An Anthology*, edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 266-75.

4. Germain Grisez, and Joseph M. Boyle jr. "The Morality of Killing: A Traditional View." In *Bioethics: An Anthology*, edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 283-87.

Additional:

5. Ronald Dworkin. *Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom*. 1st ed. New York: Knopf, 1993. Chapter 3.

6. Stephen Holland. *Bioethics: A Philosophical Introduction*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. Chapters 3 and 5.

## 20. Killing Soldiers

### Core:

1. Michael Walzer. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 4th ed. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Chapters 3 and 8.
2. Jeff McMahan. "The Ethics of Killing in War." *Ethics* 114:1 (2004), pp. 693-732.
3. Seth Lazar. "The Responsibility Dilemma for *Killing in War*." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 38:2 (2010), pp. 180-213.

### Additional:

4. Jeff McMahan. *Killing in War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
5. David Rodin, and Henry Shue, eds. *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
6. Frances M. Kamm. "Failures of Just War Theory: Terror, Harm, and Justice." *Ethics* 114:4 (2004), pp. 650-92.