

Responsibility and Global Ethics

Outline

Although the ‘Great Recession’ has undoubtedly forced the rich world into a period of introspection, the primary concerns of the 21st century should almost certainly be global. Soldiers, fighting in our names, risk their own lives and others’; we lavish wealth on war, while millions die annually of easily eradicable diseases; global warming threatens both to harm the poorest most, and to create new causes of conflict, unless we radically change our behaviour. Whatever our political beliefs the problems of war, global poverty and climate change should stand at the forefront of our consciences, as the practices in which we are presently implicated which must most urgently be examined, and either justified, or condemned. This course affords the philosophical tools to begin that examination.

Our focus is squarely on the practical problems of global ethics—some familiarity with normative ethics and metaethics will be helpful—but the first three weeks develop a basic conceptual framework to allow newcomers to ethics also to profit from the course. We introduce the concept of responsibility that ties these debates together, in particular distinguishing varieties of causal responsibility from remedial responsibility—in the sense that you can be responsible for clearing up a mess, even though you weren’t responsible for causing it. This distinction structures each section of the course, as we look first to the role of causal responsibility in war, poverty and climate change, then to the distribution of remedial responsibilities.

Of course, it makes sense to speak of responsibilities in the global sphere only if it is appropriately subject to ethical standards. Some political realists deny that it is. Their challenge is addressed in the second lecture, while the third presents a rudimentary foundation for our global responsibilities, in a theory of human rights.

We then turn to the substantive issues, beginning with killing. If we have any human rights at all, we must surely have a right to life. We consider the conventional account of what justifies killing people in war, and a revisionist critique which places responsibility at the heart of warfare, arguing that we may permissibly kill only those who are responsible for contributing to wrongful threats—thus rejecting the conventional wisdom that even soldiers fighting for an unjust cause may kill their adversaries without wrongdoing, provided they kill only combatants. Though the responsibility view seems an improvement on conventional wisdom—which strips even justified defenders of their rights to life—it raises significant problems of its own, not least that it may render many ordinary citizens permissible targets, since in modern states we are all to some degree responsible for our governments’ wars.

The great difficulty of attuning the harms of warfare to the responsibilities of the parties might lead us towards rejecting all killing, and adopting pacifism—and yet the right to life surely grounds the responsibility not to breach it ourselves, but also the responsibility to protect others from egregious violations of that right where we can. There is a good case for armed humanitarian intervention in some cases, but this responsibility to protect risks justifying overweening interventionism—risks of which British and US citizens should be especially wary.

Both causal and remedial variants of responsibility have been equally crucial in recent debates over global poverty. Thomas Pogge has prominently argued that the global economic order is harming the world’s poor, so those who design, sustain, and benefit from it are responsible for those harms, and owe rectification. After surveying the scale and impact of global poverty, we consider both Pogge’s argument, and the key objections to it, before turning to positive responsibilities to the global poor—their basis, and their likely boundaries.

Our discussion of climate change likewise begins—after setting some basic empirical parameters—with the implications of our historical responsibility for contributing to global warming. As countries, and as individuals, do we owe compensation to the victims of climatic changes that we have helped cause? Setting aside these historical arguments, what are our positive

responsibilities to future generations—and how can we resolve the theoretical and conceptual obstacles to thinking about ethical obligations in this transhistorical way? Supposing those conceptual problems can be resolved—and assuming that uncoordinated individual action will never adequately fulfil our responsibility to future generations—what are the viable policy solutions for a coordinated response to climate change?

Requirements

Reading

The following bibliography identifies core reading, which should be completed for each lecture, and additional reading, which is optional. Many of the texts are challenging, but all should be within the scope of capable undergraduates, provided you budget sufficient time. Careful notes are a good idea. Students may be informally quizzed to determine whether they have covered the required ground. If necessary, more formal tests will be used.

Written Assignments

You will write three essays of 2,000 to 2,500 words, one each on war, poverty, and climate change. Essay topics will be set. Papers will be marked according to three criteria: mastery of the debate, technical aptitude, and originality. Mastery of the debate does not mean regurgitating what you have read: you must be able to weave arguments together. Technical aptitude refers to conceptual and logical clarity. You are most likely to be original if you begin by asking why the topic matters to you, and if you have confidence in those convictions, as well as the courage to subject them to rigorous examination. For a guide to writing philosophy essays, see <http://www.sethlazar.org.uk/documents/essaywriting.pdf>.

Lecture Attendance and Participation

Lectures will occupy most of each class, but time will be set aside for questions and discussion. Participation and attendance will contribute or otherwise to your overall assessment, as per normal faculty practice.

Schedule

Responsibility, Realism, and Human Rights

1. Introduction to Responsibility and Global Justice

Introduction to the course, with a general discussion of the concept of responsibility and its application to global justice. As this is the first lecture only one reading is assigned.

Reading

1. David Miller. "Distributing Responsibilities." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 9:4 (2001), pp. 453-71.

2. Realism

Are there fundamental objections to the very idea of global ethics? Do we have any obligations at all to those beyond our national borders? Does the radical non-compliance of adversary states release us from obligations we might otherwise have?

Core:

1. Simon Caney. *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Chapter 1.
2. Michael Walzer. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 4th ed. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Chapter 1.
3. Nigel Dower. *World Ethics: The New Agenda*. 2nd ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. Chapters 2 and 3

Additional

4. Kenneth Neal Waltz. *Realism and International Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2008.
5. Kenneth Neal Waltz. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979.
6. Hans J. Morgenthau. *In Defense of the National Interest; a Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Knopf, 1951.

3. Human Rights

At least some forms of realism are obviously false; for all but radical sceptics and amoralists, human beings, wherever, whenever, and whoever they are, give moral reasons that we must each acknowledge. But how should we understand those reasons? One popular, though imperfect approach, is to think in terms of human rights.

Core:

1. Henry Shue. *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Chapters 1 and 2.
2. A. Sen. "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 32:4 (2004), pp. 315-56.
3. O. O'Neill. "The Dark Side of Human Rights." *International Affairs* 81:2 (2005), pp. 427-39.

Additional

4. Henry Shue. *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Chapter 3.
5. Charles R. Beitz. *The Idea of Human Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Chapters 1-3.
6. James Griffin. *On Human Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Chapter 1, 2, 5.
7. Susan James. "Rights as Enforceable Claims." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 103 (2003), pp. 133-47.
8. Charles R. Beitz, and Robert E. Goodin, eds. *Global Basic Rights*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Responsibility and Killing in War

4. The Conventional View of Killing in War

According to the most common understanding of international law and morality, soldiers can fight justly in war provided they kill only enemy soldiers, irrespective of what they are fighting for. Just and unjust

combatants alike enjoy the same privilege to kill one another, and face the same prohibition on killing civilians.

Core

1. Michael Walzer. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 4th ed. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Chapters 3, 8, 9
2. Yitzhak Benbaji. "A Defense of the Traditional War Convention." *Ethics* 118:3 (2008), pp. 464-95.

Additional

3. G. E. M. Anscombe. "War and Murder." In *Moral Problems: A Collection of Philosophical Essays*, edited by James Rachels. New York: Harper & Row, 1979, pp. 393-407.
4. Patrick Emerton, and Toby Handfield. "Order and Affray: Defensive Privileges in Warfare." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 37:4 (2009), pp. 382-414.
5. George I. Mavrodes. "Conventions and the Morality of War." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 4:2 (1975), pp. 117-31.
6. Christopher Kutz. "The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 33:2 (2005), pp. 148-80.

5. The Responsibility-Based Critique

The conventional view's failure to distinguish between combatants fighting for a just cause, and those who are not, and the licence it gives unjustified combatants to kill, are extremely hard to justify. Principles governing the permissible use of force in other contexts suggest that it should be directed against only those who are responsible for some wrongful threat to us, which we can avert only by harming them. Since justified combatants are not responsible for wrongful threats to unjustified combatants, they may not be permissibly killed.

Core

1. Jeff McMahan. *Killing in War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Chapters 1, 2, 5.

Additional

2. Lionel McPherson. "Innocence and Responsibility in War." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 34:4 (2004), pp. 485-506.
3. Jeff McMahan. *Killing in War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Chapters 3, 4.
4. David Rodin. *War and Self-Defense*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Chapter 2.
5. Cecile Fabre. "Guns, Food, and Liability to Attack in War." *Ethics* 120:1 (2010).
6. C. A. J. Coady. "The Status of Combatants." In *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers*, edited by David Rodin and Henry Shue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 153-75.

6. Problems with Responsibility in War

The responsibility-based critique of the conventional view itself faces numerous objections. If minimal responsibility is sufficient for liability to attack, liability threatens to engulf almost all adults in modern states, who are all at least minimally responsible for their state's wars. If a higher threshold is presupposed, then many combatants whom we must kill to win will not be liable, and distinguishing between them and liable combatants will be impossible, so we must either endorse pacifism, or explain how those rights can be justifiably overridden.

Core

1. Seth Lazar. "The Responsibility Dilemma for *Killing in War*." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 38:2 (2010), pp. 180-213.
2. Christopher Kutz. "Fearful Symmetry." In *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers*, edited by David Rodin and Henry Shue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 69-86.
3. Henry Shue. "Laws of War." In *The Philosophy of International Law*, edited by Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 511-30.

Additional

4. Seth Lazar. "Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defense." *Ethics* 119:4 (2009), pp. 699-728.
5. David Rodin. "The Moral Inequality of Soldiers: Why Jus in Bello Asymmetry Is Half Right." In *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers*, edited by David Rodin and Henry Shue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 44-68.
6. Cheyney C. Ryan. "Moral Equality, Victimhood, and the Sovereignty-Symmetry Problem." In *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers*, edited by David Rodin and Henry Shue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 131-52.
7. Jeff McMahan. "The Morality of War and the Law of War." In *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers*, edited by David Rodin and Henry Shue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 19-43.

The Responsibility to Protect

7. Armed Humanitarian Intervention

Few would disagree that people everywhere enjoy a basic right not to be killed, but do we adequately respect that right only by not killing, or do we also owe back-up duties to protect people against being killed? In particular, when mass atrocity crimes such as genocide and mass enslavement are taking place, can we permissibly stand idly by?

Core

1. Michael Walzer. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 4th ed. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Preface
2. Henry Shue. "Let Whatever Is Smouldering Erupt? Conditional Sovereignty, Reviewable Intervention, and Rwanda 1994." In *Between Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United Nations, the State and Civil Society*, edited by Albert J. Paolini, Anthony P. Jarvis and Christian Reus-Smit. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 35-59.
3. Jeff McMahan. "Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality." In *Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover*, edited by N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen and Jeff McMahan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 44-72.

Additional

4. James Pattison. *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
5. C. A. J. Coady. "The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention." *Peaceworks* 45 (2002). Available free from <http://www.usip.org/pubs/PeaceWorks/pwks45.pdf>.
6. Andrew Altman, and Christopher Heath Wellman. "From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence." *Ethics* 118:1 (2008), pp. 228-57.
7. Simon Caney. *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Chapter 7.

8. Overweening Interventionism

If we accept an expansive account of our positive responsibilities to those threatened with these grievous harms, do we risk committing ourselves to adventurist interventionism, seeking not only to avert grave injustices, but also to bring about what seem to us to be great goods?

Core

1. Michael Walzer. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 4th ed. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Chapter 6.
2. David Luban. "Just War and Human Rights." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 9:2 (1980), pp. 160-81.
3. Michael Walzer. "The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)." *Social Research* 69 (2002), pp. 925-44.
4. David Mellow. "Iraq: A Morally Justified Resort to War." *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 23:3 (2006), pp. 293-310.

Additional

5. N. Dobos. "A State to Call Their Own: Insurrection, Intervention, and the Communal Integrity Thesis." *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 27:1 (2010), pp. 26-38.
6. A. Buchanan. "The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 7:1 (1999), pp. 71-87.
7. ICISS. *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. Chapters 2-5.
8. Jeff McMahan, and Robert McKim. "The Just War and the Gulf War." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 23:4 (1993), pp. 501-41.
9. Jeff McMahan. "The Morality of Military Occupation." *Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review* 31:7 (2009), pp. 101-23.

Negative Responsibility for Global Poverty

9. The Scale and Impact of Global Poverty

Separating fact from interpretation is never easy, and the global poverty debate is no exception. But before asking who is responsible, we need first to determine the scale of the problem.

Core

1. Thomas Pogge. *Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric*. Malden, MA: Polity, 2010. Chapters 1, 4 and 5.
2. Thomas Pogge. *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. Chapter 1.

Additional

3. Sudhir Anand, Paul Segal, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. *Debates on the Measurement of Global Poverty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

10. Are the Global Rich Harming the Global Poor?

Is the plight of the global poor the fault of the global rich? Are the rich harming the poor, by imposing on them an unjust economic system that avoidably blights their lives?

Core

1. Thomas Pogge. *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. Chapters 6, 8.

2. Thomas Pogge. "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties." *Ethics and International Affairs* 19:1 (2005), pp. 55-83.
3. L. Wenar. "Property Rights and the Resource Curse." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 36:1 (2008), pp. 2-32.

Additional

4. Thomas Pogge. *Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric*. Malden, MA: Polity, 2010. Chapter 2.
5. Bashshar Haydar. "Extreme Poverty and Global Responsibility." *Metaphilosophy* 36:1-2 (2005), pp. 240-53.
6. L. Wenar. "Responsibility and Severe Poverty." In *Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?*, edited by Thomas Pogge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 255-74.
7. C. Barry. "Applying the Contribution Principle." *Metaphilosophy* 36:1-2 (2005), pp. 210-27.

11. The Case Against Pogge

Two principal lines of critique: even if Pogge's claims about the global economic order were true, would his attributions of moral responsibility to citizens of rich countries be justifiable? And does his empirical argument rest on a plausible account of causation?

Core

1. Alan Patten. "Should We Stop Thinking About Poverty in Terms of Helping the Poor?" *Ethics and International Affairs* 19:1 (2005), pp. 19-27.
2. M. Risse. "How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?" *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 33:4 (2005), pp. 349-76.
3. David Miller. *National Responsibility and Global Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Chapter 9.
4. Norbert Anwander. "Contributing and Benefiting: Two Grounds for Duties to the Victims of Injustice." *Ethics & International Affairs* 19:1 (2005), pp. 39-45.

Additional

5. Mathias Risse. "Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?" *Ethics & International Affairs* 19:1 (2005), pp. 9-18.
6. J. Montero. "Global Deprivation—Whose Duties? Some Problems with the Contribution Principle." *Metaphilosophy* 39:4-5 (2008), pp. 612-20.
7. Elizabeth Ashford. "The Alleged Dichotomy between Positive and Negative Rights and Duties." In *Global Basic Rights*, edited by Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 92-112.

Positive Responsibilities to the Global Poor

12. The Case for Positive Duties

Even if we are not harming the global poor, doesn't the degree of suffering, and the ease with which we could remedy at least some of it, place urgent responsibilities on the earth's rich population?

Core

1. Simon Caney. *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
2. Henry Shue. "Mediating Duties." *Ethics* 98:4 (1988), pp. 687-704.
3. Peter Singer. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1:3 (1972), pp. 229-43.

Additional

4. Henry Shue. *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy*. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
5. David Miller. *National Responsibility and Global Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Chapter 7.
6. James Griffin. *On Human Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Chapter 10.
7. Charles R. Beitz. *The Idea of Human Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Chapter 7.

13. Limiting Positive Responsibilities 1: Special Responsibilities

Granted that the present state of the world is unjust by almost any standard, are there any grounds for applying different principles of justice at the domestic and the global level? One possibility is that we have special duties to compatriots, over and above those we owe to them as human beings.

Core

1. David Miller. *National Responsibility and Global Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Chapter 5.
2. Samuel Scheffler. *Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Chapters 3-7.

Additional

3. David Miller. "Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 8:1 (2005), pp. 63-81.
4. Thomas Pogge. *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002. Chapter 5.
5. Arash Abizadeh, and Pablo Gilibert. "Is There a Genuine Tension between Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism and Special Responsibilities?" *Philosophical Studies* 138:3 (2008), pp. 349-65.
6. Seth Lazar. "Do Associative Duties Really Not Matter?" *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17:1 (2009), pp. 90-101.
7. C. Barry, and P. Gilibert. "Does Global Egalitarianism Provide an Impractical and Unattractive Ideal of Justice?" *International Affairs* 84:5 (2008), pp. 1025-39.

14. Limiting Responsibility 2: Justice as Practice-Dependent

Perhaps the mistake is to apply standards of justice to the global sphere—is there something irreducibly institutional about justice, that makes it an appropriate benchmark only for individual states? Is it dependent on the practice of social organisation within those states?

Core

1. Thomas Nagel. "The Problem of Global Justice." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 33:2 (2005), pp. 113-47.
2. A. Sangiovanni. "Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 35:1 (2007), pp. 3-39.
3. Joshua Cohen, and Charles Sabel. "Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?" *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 34:2 (2006), pp. 147-75.

Additional

4. L. Valentini. "Global Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism." *Journal of Political Philosophy* (2010), pp. no-no.
5. A. J. Julius. "Nagel's Atlas." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 34:2 (2006), pp. 176-92.

6. M. Ronzoni. "The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent Account." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 37:3 (2009), pp. 229-56.

Responsibility for Climate Change

15. Climate Change and its Implications

We first need at least a rudimentary grip on the science, before we can proceed with the ethics.

Core

1. Jerry D. Mahlman. "The Long Timescales of Human-Caused Climate Warming." In *Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics*, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Richard B. Howarth. Oxford: Elsevier JAI, 2005, pp. 3-29.
2. Stephen M. Gardiner. "Ethics and Global Climate Change." *Ethics* 114:3 (2004), pp. 555-600.
3. Richard B. Alley. *The Two-Mile Time Machine: Ice Cores, Abrupt Climate Change, and Our Future*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Additional

4. Clive Ponting. *A New Green History of the World: The Environment and the Collapse of Great Civilizations*. Rev. ed. New York: Penguin Books, 2007.
5. Clive Hamilton. *Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth About Climate Change*. Washington, DC: Earthscan, 2010.
6. Mark Lynas. *Six Degrees : Our Future on a Hotter Planet*. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 2008.
7. Nicholas Stern. "The Economics of Climate Change." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, edited by Stephen Mark Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson and Henry Shue. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 39-76.

16. Should the Polluter Pay?

Should the responsibility to resolve the problems caused by climate change fall primarily on those who are either most responsible for contributing to global warming, or who have benefited from the irresponsible conduct of previous generations?

Core

1. Henry Shue. "Global Environment and International Inequality." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 101-11.
2. Simon Caney. "Human Rights, Responsibilities, and Climate Change." In *Global Basic Rights*, edited by Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 227-47.
3. S. Caney. "Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37:3 (2006), pp. 464-82.
4. Weisbach, David A., Responsibility for Climate Change, by the Numbers (January 8, 2009). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 448; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 255. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324857>

Additional

5. Steve Vanderheiden. *Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Chapter 5.
6. H. Shue, "Historical Responsibility", Technical Briefing for Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention [AWG-LCA], SBSTA, UNFCCC, Bonn, 4 June 2009. <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/1_shue_rev.pdf>.

7. D. Moellendorf. "Justice and the Assignment of the Intergenerational Costs of Climate Change." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 40:2 (2009), pp. 204–24.
8. Risse, Mathias. "Who Should Shoulder the Burden? Global Climate Change and Common Ownership of the Earth" (January 15, 2009). HKS Working Paper No. RWP08-075. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338257>
9. C. McKinnon. "Runaway Climate Change: A Justice-Based Case for Precautions." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 40:2 (2009), pp. 187–203.

17. Climate Change and Individual Responsibility

We usually speak of the responsibility of countries and industries for climate change, but how should we judge our own irresponsible conduct? Citizens of rich countries pollute by orders of magnitude more than the poor. What ought we to do in response?

Core

1. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. "It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 332–46.
2. Dale Jamieson. "When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 315–31.
3. Simon Caney. "Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility and Global Climate Change." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 122–45.

Additional

4. Judith Lichtenberg. "Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the "New Harms"." *Ethics* 120:3 (2010), pp. 557–78.
5. R. Attfield. "Mediated Responsibilities, Global Warming, and the Scope of Ethics." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 40:2 (2009), pp. 225–36.
6. Jessica Fahliquist. "Moral Responsibility for Environmental Problems—Individual or Institutional?" *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 22:2 (2009), pp. 109–24.
7. Margaret Moore. "Global Justice, Climate Change and Miller's Theory of Responsibility." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 11:4 (2008), pp. 501 – 17.

Climate Change and Responsibilities to Future Generations

18. Challenges of Intergenerational Justice 1: Non-Identity and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer

Thinking about climate change and intergenerational justice leads us into complex moral cul-de-sacs, which we need the conceptual equipment to break out of. This week, we focus on the non-identity problem and the puzzle of the self-torturer.

Core

1. Derek Parfit. "Energy Policy and the Further Future: The Identity Problem." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 112–21.
2. Steve Vanderheiden. *Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Chapter 4.
3. C. Andreou. "Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 34:1 (2006), pp. 95–108.

Additional

4. Stephen Gardiner. "A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics, and the Problem of Moral Corruption." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 87–100.

5. J. Reiman. "Being Fair to Future People: The Non-Identity Problem in the Original Position." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 35:1 (2007), pp. 69-92.

19. Challenges of Intergenerational Justice 2: Discounting and Risk

How should we weigh the interests of future generations? How much should we sacrifice, for what gain to them? How should we choose when, however clear the science is, there remain great uncertainties both about the threat, and about the consequences of our actions?

Core

1. Simon Caney. "Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth, and Risk." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 40:2 (2009), pp. 163-86.
2. Henry Shue. "Deadly Delays, Saving Opportunities: Creating a More Dangerous World?" In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 146-62.
3. John Broome. "The Most Important Thing About Climate Change." In *Public Policy: Why Ethics Matters*, edited by Jonathan Boston, Andrew Bradstock and David Eng. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010, pp. 101-16, available online at http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/public_policy/pdf/ch06.pdf.

Additional

4. Stephen Gardiner. "A Core Precautionary Principle." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 14:1 (2006), pp. 33-60.
5. Neil A. Manson. "Formulating the Precautionary Principle." *Environmental Ethics* 24:3 (2002), pp. 263-74.
6. Simon Caney. "Human Rights, Climate Change, and Discounting." *Environmental Politics* 17:4 (2008), pp. 536 - 55.
7. J. Broome. "Discounting the Future." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 23:2 (1994), pp. 128-56.

20. Remedial Responsibility: Policy Responses to Climate Change

Whatever our individual responsibilities, there will be no solution to the problems caused by climate change without a coordinated institutional response. What are the options?

Core

1. Stephen Gardiner. "Is 'Arming the Future' with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil? Some Doubts About the Ethics of Intentionally Manipulating the Climate System." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 284-314.
2. Robert E. Goodin. "Selling Environmental Indulgences." In *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings*, Gardiner et al. (eds.), pp. 231-46.
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